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Evaluating Pricing Strategy Using
e-Commerce Data: Evidence and
Estimation Challenges
Anindya Ghose and Arun Sundararajan
Abstract. As Internet-based commerce becomes increasingly widespread,
large data sets about the demand for and pricing of a wide variety of
products become available. These present exciting new opportunities
for empirical economic and business research, but also raise new statis-
tical issues and challenges. In this article, we summarize research that
aims to assess the optimality of price discrimination in the software
industry using a large e-commerce panel data set gathered from Ama-
zon.com. We describe the key parameters that relate to demand and
cost that must be reliably estimated to accomplish this research suc-
cessfully, and we outline our approach to estimating these parameters.
This includes a method for “reverse engineering” actual demand levels
from the sales ranks reported by Amazon, and approaches to estimating
demand elasticity, variable costs and the optimality of pricing choices
directly from publicly available e-commerce data. Our analysis raises
many new challenges to the reliable statistical analysis of e-commerce
data and we conclude with a brief summary of some salient ones.
Key words and phrases: Electronic commerce, pricing strategy, price
discrimination, versioning, quality differentiation, sales rank.
1. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of Internet-based commerce has pro-
vided academic researchers with a wealth of new
data on demand and pricing across a number of
industries. The availability of these data and their
growing use in empirical studies of electronic com-
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merce raises a number of new statistical and econo-
metric issues. In this article, we describe how we
empirically analyze and evaluate pricing strategy in
the consumer software industry using a large-scale e-
commerce data set from Amazon.com. We describe
some of the methods we have applied to our analysis
of these data, how we have adapted them to address
issues unique to e-commerce data, and we summa-
rize open challenges whose resolution will help fa-
cilitate more robust empirical research in electronic
commerce.
Pricing strategy in the consumer software indus-
try (and in many other industries) often involves the
use of price discrimination, which, broadly, aims to
identify (directly or otherwise) customers who are
willing to pay more for a product and to charge
them a higher price. Beyond the notion of “first-
degree” price discrimination which involves charging
different consumers different prices for an identical
good (Aron, Sundararajan and Viswanathan, 2006;
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Choudhary et al., 2005), there are a variety of ways
that firms price-discriminate. For example, a seller
may price differently depending on whether a con-
sumer has purchased from the firm before (these are
typically called introductory offers). A seller may
vary the price of a product depending on how many
units of the product are purchased by an individ-
ual consumer; this is commonly referred to as non-
linear pricing (Sundararajan, 2004b). A seller may
base the price of a product on whether other related
products are also purchased from the same firm: this
is called bundling (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999),
and a seller may choose to implement either pure
bundling, under which a set of products are sold
only as a bundle, or mixed bundling, under which
both the bundle and individual products are sold
(Ghose and Sundararajan, 2005b). As an example
of the latter, Microsoft sells its Office suite of soft-
ware as a bundle of Word, Excel and PowerPoint
in addition to selling each of these products indi-
vidually. A seller may create different but related
versions of a product (typically one of higher qual-
ity or with more features) and price them differently.
This is referred to as versioning and aims to price-
discriminate by exploiting differences in how much
different customers value product quality. There are
multiple versions of a large number of popular desk-
top software titles that differ only in their quality
or number of features (rather than in their develop-
ment or release date) and that are sold at different
prices. Current examples include Adobe Acrobat,
TurboTax, Microsoft Money and Norton AntiVirus.
These are examples of software titles for which a firm
has developed a flagship version, disabled a subset
of the features or modules of this version, and re-
leased both the higher quality version and one or
more lower quality versions simultaneously. A re-
lated form of price discrimination is based on re-
leasing successive generations of the same product in
multiple periods, with a period of time where the old
and new generations overlap; since each new gener-
ation represents an improvement in the overall per-
formance of the product, the simultaneous presence
of two or more successive generations is analogous
to the presence of two or more related products of
varying quality (Ghose, Huang and Sundararajan,
2005).
The objective of a software company that price-
discriminates is to maximize the profits it generates
from the sale of its products. However, price dis-
crimination can often have countervailing effects on
a firm’s profits. For instance, two consequences of
introducing a lower quality version of an existing
product to price-discriminate are the loss of prof-
its from customers who switch from purchasing the
higher quality version to purchasing the lower qual-
ity version (commonly termed cannibalization) and
a gain in profits from new customers, for the lower
quality version, who either did not purchase the
product earlier or who purchased a competing prod-
uct. [In many ways this is similar to the cannibaliza-
tion that occurs when used products compete simul-
taneously with new products (Ghose, Telang and
Krishnan, 2005; Ghose, Smith and Telang, 2006).]
The interplay between these consequences eventu-
ally determines the optimality of versioning. A simi-
lar pair of consequences, with opposing effects, char-
acterizes the eventual profitability of bundling. Sim-
ilarly, nonlinear pricing that discounts high usage
levels too extensively can reduce a seller’s profits.
Thus, to profit from price discrimination, a soft-
ware company must make an appropriate choice of
the form of price discrimination; it must choose its
prices optimally and sometimes it must determine
optimal quality levels for an inferior (related) set of
products or the size of a bundle. There is no pub-
lished research with evidence that software compa-
nies in fact make these price-discrimination choices
optimally; however, the availability of detailed price
and demand data from e-commerce sites like Ama-
zon now makes it feasible to empirically assess the
optimality of their choices. A first goal of our re-
search program is therefore to use these data to
evaluate the optimality of such price-discrimination
strategies in the software industry empirically. This
is a problem of significant economic importance.
To do so, one first needs a method to convert
“sales ranks” reported by Amazon.com into actual
demand levels. Amazon publishes a sales rank for
each product it sells, which is the rank of the prod-
uct within its category based on recent demand (more
on this later). Next, the demand system associated
with our products (i.e., how the variation in prices
is associated with variation in demand) needs to be
estimated. Amazon.com does not provide any data
about the variable cost of the products it sells: we
therefore also need to infer these costs from our data
(since the profit to a seller is determined not just by
price charged and quantity sold, but also by its cost
per unit). We describe our approach to accomplish
each of these goals. We briefly summarize other esti-
mates that contribute to our research program and
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Fig. 1. Sequence of steps to determine the optimality of software pricing from e-commerce data.
we conclude with some of the key statistical chal-
lenges that emerge from our analysis. The flow chart
in Figure 1 indicates the steps we prescribe for esti-
mating the optimality of pricing.
2. SUMMARY OF DATA
Our data are compiled from publicly available in-
formation on new software prices and sales rankings
at Amazon.com, the largest on-line retailer of con-
sumer software. Our data are gathered using auto-
mated Java programs to access and parse HTML
and XML pages downloaded from its web site, three
times each day, at equally spaced intervals. Our sam-
ple contains 330 products randomly selected from
each of four major categories—business and produc-
tivity, security and utilities, graphics and develop-
ment and operating systems software. (Our random
sample was created by first compiling a list of soft-
ware products that were sold on Amazon during the
year and then using Excel’s random number gener-
ator to choose from them. We chose a sample size
of 330 since this yielded what we felt was a suffi-
cient number of distinct titles within each major cat-
egory.) We collect all relevant data on list prices (the
manufacturer’s suggested price), new prices (the price
charged by Amazon.com), sales ranks (to be dis-
cussed further soon), product release date, average
customer review and number of reviewers who con-
tributed to this average. To facilitate a clearer un-
derstanding of how each of these pieces of informa-
tion is reported to a consumer on Amazon.com’s web
site, a screen shot of an Amazon page is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. How the data we gather from Amazon.com are displayed on its web site.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Sales rank 1649.61 1971.26 1 11622
List price 69.16 226.17 19.95 1799.99
Amazon price 65.53 208.57 14.95 1699.99
New non-Amazon price 17.74 23.08 10.01 209.99
Customer rating 3.14 0.99 1 5
Number of reviewers 25.72 66.3 1 606
Days release 717.7 1336.22 0 1750
Our sample consists of products that have differ-
ent versions as well as products that are sold as bun-
dles (in addition to the individual components). We
are able to determine this because software manu-
facturers use terms like “premier,” “deluxe” or “stan-
dard” to denote versions of the same title that vary
in quality (which is typically measured by the num-
ber of features). Similarly, a product suite that con-
tains individual products has the term “bundle” as-
sociated with it. The details of individual compo-
nents within each bundle are provided in a bundle’s
product description. Based on the release date of
the product, we can infer if it is the current or the
previous year’s edition.
We also collect data on secondary market activity,
including used prices (prices charged by sellers who
have posted second-hand copies of the product for
sale) and new prices from non-Amazon sellers (these
are sellers who are not affiliated with Amazon but
are allowed to sell goods on Amazon in exchange
for a commission on the transaction price). Table 1
provides summary statistics of our data.
We have categorized our software titles in three
ways: (i) based on those titles that have just two
versions and those that have more than two ver-
sions, (ii) based on whether the title is sold as part
of a bundle of other products or as a stand-alone
product, and (iii) based on whether the title is from
the most recent generation or from a previous gener-
ation. This categorization is summarized in Table 2.
Thus, for example, our sample contains 32 unique
titles which each have two versions (a higher quality
and a lower quality version). Similarly, our sample
contains 56 unique titles which each have both the
current and the previous generation available simul-
taneously. The other rows can be interpreted in a
similar way.
Our data were collected between January 2005
and November 2005. (For the duration of our study
there were a few instances during which the Java
program was unable to collect data all three times
during the day. In most cases this happened if the
Amazon server was not functioning properly during
the time the data were being gathered. However,
this does not affect our analysis, primarily because
of the low frequency with which prices are changed
by Amazon. In general, we find that there are far
fewer price changes than changes in sales rank; thus
any missing information on prices within the same
day will have almost no impact on our estimates of
price elasticities.) The distributions of sales ranks
and retail (Amazon) prices across our products are
summarized in Figure 3(a) and (b). We also provide
a scatterplot of prices and sales ranks in Figure 3(c).
3. ESTIMATION AND PRICING
3.1 Demand Estimation
Amazon.com does not report its periodic demand
levels. Instead, it reports a sales rank for each prod-
uct sold on its site, which ranks the demand for a
product relative to other products in its category.
Thus, the lower the cardinal value of the sales rank,
the higher the demand for that particular item. Prior
research (e.g., Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003;
Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, 2003) has associated
these sales ranks with demand levels. To do so, the
authors assume that the rank data have a Pareto
distribution (i.e., a power law). They then convert
sales ranks into periodic demand levels by conjectur-
ing the Pareto relationship log[Q] = α+β log[rank ],
where Q is the (unobserved) demand for a prod-
uct, rank is the (observed) sales rank of the prod-
uct and α,β are industry or category-specific pa-
rameters. [Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) reported
that evidence that the Pareto distribution fits well
can be found using the weekly Wall Street Journal
book sales index, which, unlike other bestseller lists,
gives an index of the actual quantity sold. This index
is constructed by surveying Amazon.com, BN.com,
Table 2
Various product categories in sample
Number of Total number
Product category unique titles of products
Bundles 68 136
Versions (2) 32 64
Versions (>2) 19 57
Successive generation 56 112
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(c)
Fig. 3. The distribution of (a) sales ranks and (b) prices across observations in our data set. The histograms are based on
a single entry per product. (c) Scatterplot of retail prices and sales ranks for all products in our sample.
and several large brick and mortar book chains. For
discussions on the use of power law distributions
to describe rank data, see Pareto (1896/1897) and
Quandt (1964).]
A number of recent studies (e.g., Ghose, Smith
and Telang, 2006) pertaining to the book industry
have used estimates of α and β from this prior liter-
ature. However, these are industry-specific parame-
ters and, to our knowledge, there are no correspond-
ing estimates available for software. Furthermore, in
summer 2004, Amazon altered its sales rank system
in the following way: it eliminated its three-tier sys-
tem, updating ranks each hour for most products
(rather than merely for the top products), and it
moved to a system that uses exponential decays to
give more weight in the sales rank to newer pur-
chases. The exact details of the calculation are pro-
prietary to Amazon (e.g., the half-life of the decay).
In the earlier three-tier system, there were three dis-
tinct ranking schemes on Amazon: one for the top
selling 10,000 products, another for the products be-
tween 10,000 and 100,000, and a third for ranks
above 100,000. Products with sales ranks between
1 and 10,000 were reranked every hour, products
in the range from 10,000 to 100,000 were reranked
once a day and products with ranks greater than
a 100,000 were updated once a month (Chevalier
and Goolsbee, 2003). The current system involves
reranking all products every hour.
Toward a more current and accurate reverse en-
gineering of the ranking system to infer actual peri-
odic demand, we have designed and conducted an in-
dependent analysis to convert measured sales ranks
into demand data. Retaining the assumption of a
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Pareto relationship between demand and sales rank,
we combine a series of purchase experiments with
the analysis of a time series of sales ranks of all the
330 products in our sample to estimate both α and
β.
Our purchasing experiment proceeded as follows.
Over a two-week period in mid-June 2005, we col-
lected hourly sales rank data for each of the products
in our panel, yielding a time series of 336 observa-
tions for each product. For products not ranked too
high, a general trend in these time series is an ex-
tended downward drift in the rank value over many
hours (i.e., the rank becomes a progressively larger
number), followed by intermittent spikes which re-
sult in a large upward shift in rank (i.e., the rank
became a smaller number suddenly). This is illus-
trated for two candidate products in Figure 4. We
interpret these spikes as reflecting time periods in
which one or more purchases have occurred.
This procedure yielded a data set of a certain
number of observations, which associated a weekly
demand level with each average sales rank, for two
successive weeks. Weekly unit sales ranged from 0
to 16. Using the implied pairs of average weekly de-
mand and average sales rank, we then estimated the
ordinary least squares (OLS) equation
log[Q+1] = log[α] + β log[sales rank ],(1)
where Q is average weekly demand, and sales rank
is the corresponding average sales rank. [Similar to
Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003), we used White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator (see Greene,
2000, page 463) to estimate both parameters.] The
results of these experiments yielded α = 8.352 and
β = −0.828. The following list provides a sense of
what these estimates imply:
Weekly sales of two units correspond to an average
sales rank of about 3100.
Weekly sales of 10 units correspond to an average
sales rank of about 440.
Weekly sales of 25 units correspond to an aver-
age sales rank of about 150. [The standard errors
for α and β were 0.042 and 0.032, resp., and the
estimates were significant at the 1% level. Further
details of this experiment and its results are pre-
sented in Ghose and Sundararajan (2005a).]
An interesting aspect of our approach is that it al-
lows one to characterize a number of economic mea-
sures of interest (price markups and demand elas-
ticities) based purely on sales rank ratios and the
parameter β. This provides a framework for a wider
range of future empirical research in e-commerce
and also reduces the extent to which one’s results
are affected by the error in estimating α.
Our sample encompasses multiple products with
observations collected over time, and our data set
therefore has elements of both cross-sectional and
time-series data. Consistent with existing published
and current research, we analyze our observations
as panel data (for a detailed treatment of the econo-
metric analysis of panel data, see Wooldridge, 2002).
3.2 Estimates of Price Elasticity
Given the price variation across products and across
time, and the measures of quantity in each period
that come from the sales ranks, we can infer the
price sensitivity of consumers to on-line product sales.
This would require estimating own- and cross-price
elasticities of the products in our sample. The price
elasticity of demand is a measure of the sensitivity of
demand to price changes. Specifically, the own-price
elasticity of demand is calculated as the percent-
age change in demand caused by a unit percentage
change in a product’s own price, and the cross-price
elasticity of demand is calculated as the percent-
age change in demand caused by a unit percentage
change in another product’s price. In our context,
the other product could be either a different ver-
sion (high or low quality) of the same good or a
component of a bundle. Own-price elasticities are
generally negative—the quantity of a product sold
decreases as its price increases. On the other hand,
cross-price elasticities can be either positive or neg-
ative. If X and Y are substitute goods (e.g., the
two versions of a product), the cross-price elastic-
ity of demand is positive; that is, the quantity of
good X varies directly with a change in the price of
good Y . If X and Y are complementary goods (e.g.,
computer hardware and software), the cross-price
elasticity of demand may be negative; that is, the
quantity of good X varies inversely with a change
in the price of good Y . Figure 5 shows a plot of the
changes in prices and sales ranks for the two ver-
sions (of high and low quality) of a specific product
for a specific period of time.
To compute own-price and cross-price elasticities,
we estimate OLS regressions which control for un-
observed heterogeneity across products and across
categories (we use the fixed effects transformation).
Based on these estimates, we subsequently compute
the own- and cross-price elasticities by weighting
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Fig. 4. The variation of sales rank with time for the higher and lower quality versions of one of the software titles we track.
The charts on top illustrate sales ranks gathered during successive 8-hour periods, charted for a 6-month window of our data.
The charts below graph hourly sales rank data for the specific shorter time window (between the vertical lines on the upper
charts) and illustrate the sales rank spikes associated with sales. The flat portions of these lower charts reflect (short) intervals
where Amazon did not update the sales ranks that it published on its web site.
Fig. 5. The variation of sales rank with retail price for two versions of a specific software title in our data set. A line between
two points indicates that the ( price, sales rank) had changed from one of the points to the other in successive periods.
8 A. GHOSE AND A. SUNDARARAJAN
them with the appropriate Pareto mapping param-
eter β, which was estimated earlier. In other words,
estimating the equations using log ranks, rather than
actual quantities, yields the correct elasticities, but
they are scaled up by the Pareto mapping param-
eter. This is similar to the approach used in prior lit-
erature (Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003; Ghose, Smith
and Telang, 2006). These regressions have the gen-
eral form
log(rank it) = a+ φ log(pit) +
∑
j∈Si
γj log(pjt)
(2)
+ λ log(pˆit) + ωX + εit,
where i indexes the product in question (e.g., the
high-quality version of a specific title), t indexes the
date, Si is the set of products whose prices affect the
demand for product i (e.g., the price of a lower qual-
ity version corresponding to a high-quality version
or the price of a bundle which contains product i as
one component), pˆit is the lowest price posted for
the corresponding non-Amazon marketplace prod-
uct (the best price across all conditions by compet-
ing sellers on Amazon’s secondary market) and X
is a vector of control variables. Our control vari-
ables include the time since the product was released
(days release), the average customer rating (cus-
tomer rating) and the number of reviewers (num-
ber of reviewers) who have reviewed the product.
[We use the fixed effects (within) transformation
(Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 10.5) to control for un-
observed heterogeneity across products.]
We can use the results of this regression to cal-
culate the relevant own- and cross-price elasticities
ηii and ηij , respectively. Note that φ is a measure of
how sensitive the product’s own sales rank is to the
product’s own price, while γj is a measure of how
sensitive the product’s own sales rank is to the price
of the substitute product. Let (pi,Qi) represent the
quantity and price of product i and let (pj,Qj) rep-
resent the quantity and price of product j. One can
easily show that having estimated the parameters φ
and each of the γj ’s from the above regression, the
own-price elasticity of demand for product i (Mas-
Collel, Whinston and Green, 1995) is given by
ηii = βφ=
∂Qi
∂pi
×
pi
Qi
,(3)
where β was estimated in Section 3.1 and the cross-
price elasticity of demand for product i with respect
to product j is
ηij = βγj =
∂Qi
∂pj
×
pj
Qi
.(4)
These elasticity estimates describe how demand varies
with price, and form the basis for analyzing the opti-
mality of a firm’s chosen price-discrimination strat-
egy, since they enable us, for example, to assess how
demand would vary if the firm altered its price dis-
crimination by removing a version or discontinuing
a bundle. They also are inputs to the estimation
process for variable costs, as described in the fol-
lowing section. (In contrast to some other demand
estimation models, we do not have data on other in-
puts to the marketing mix, such as advertising. It is
conceivable that sales ranks may also be affected by
off-line advertising. In the absence of data, we are
unable to capture this effect in our model.)
3.3 Cost Estimation
Many products in information technology (IT) in-
dustries have an unusual cost structure: high fixed
costs of production, but near-zero or zero variable
costs of production. This cost structure character-
izes a class of technology products which are col-
lectively termed information goods. Put differently,
the cost of producing the first unit of an information
good is very high, yet the cost of producing each ad-
ditional unit is virtually nothing. For instance, Mi-
crosoft spends hundreds of millions of dollars to de-
velop each version of its Windows operating system.
Once this first copy of the operating system has been
developed, however, it can be replicated costlessly,
which leads to widespread piracy, a factor which can
be incorporated into pricing following Sundararajan
(2004a), but which we do not explicitly model in this
study. Early examples of information goods were
computer-based information services and software;
currently, a wide variety of diverse products—video,
music, textbooks, digital art, to name a few—share
this unique cost structure.
Contrary to what is commonly assumed in the
IT economics literature, packaged consumer soft-
ware is not an “information good.” It has positive
variable costs associated with its production, pack-
aging and distribution, and these may represent a
substantial fraction of the price of such software, es-
pecially since a number of titles are priced under
fifty dollars. Therefore, to assess the optimality of a
seller’s choice of price discrimination, we need esti-
mates of the variable costs of the software titles in
our data set. We estimate the variable costs by in-
ferring the Lerner index for each product version i,
defined as the ratio of the markup to the price, that
is, ((pi − ci)/pi), where pi is the retail price and ci
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is the variable cost of product i. Markup is simply
defined as price minus marginal cost, that is, the
margin on each unit of sale.
To do this estimation reliably using e-commerce
data, we have developed an extension of the model
of Hausman (1994) that provides a way to estimate
markups using just sales rank data and prices. We
begin with the approach of Hausman (1994), who
provides the following equation to estimate the
markups for products sold by multiproduct oligo-
polists, weighted by their market share. Since soft-
ware firms generally sell multiple products and com-
pete with multiple firms in the market, it is impor-
tant to consider this formulation of the Lerner index.
Consider a set of related products indexed by i. The
first-order conditions for oligopoly profit maximiza-
tion yield the system of equations
sj +
∑
i
[(
pi− ci
pi
)
si
]
ηij = 0,
(5)
j = 1,2, . . . , n.
Here, si is the demand share of product i (demand
share is the ratio of revenues from product i to the
total revenues from all related products), ηii is prod-
uct i’s elasticity of demand with respect to its own
price and ηij is the cross-price elasticity of demand
with respect to the price of product j. We therefore
have a system of linear equations
s+N ′m= 0,(6)
where s is the vector of revenue shares, N is the ma-
trix of cross-price elasticities [ηij ] and m= [m0,m1,
. . . ,mn], where
mi =
(
pi − ci
pi
)
si(7)
is the Lerner index of product i multiplied by its
product share. The marginal costs ci of each indi-
vidual product can then be estimated by inverting
N to solve the system of equations (6).
Our extension of this approach allows the esti-
mation of variable costs using just sales ranks, the
parameter β which we estimate in Section 3.1, and
observed retail prices. Our system of equations for a
set of related products 0,1, . . . , n with prices pi and
sales ranks Ri is derived from the above equations
as
sj =−
∑
i
[
pi − ci
pi
si
]
ηij , j = 1,2, . . . , n,(8)
which implies that
sj =
∑
i
[
pi− ci
pi
si
]
βγj ,(9)
which in turn implies that
sj =
∑
i
[
pi − ci
pi
]
β
(
pi
Rj
dRj
dpi
)
si(10)
or
sj = β
∑
i
[
(pi − ci)
si
Rj
dRj
dpi
]
,(11)
where
1
si
= 1+
pi
pj
(
Rj
Ri
)β
.(12)
3.4 Optimality of Pricing
In this section, we summarize how we can test the
optimality of pricing strategies by software manu-
facturers. Consider the case when the software firm
is producing two versions of the product—a high-
quality version and a low-quality version. The total
profit from a pair of versions i and j is thus
pi = k(pi − ci)Qi + k(pj − cj)Qj .(13)
First-order conditions for profit maximization with
respect to prices yield the partial derivatives
∂pi
∂pi
= kQi + k(pi − ci)
∂Qi
∂pi
(14)
+ k(pj − cj)
∂Qj
∂pi
,
∂pi
∂pj
= k(pi − ci)
∂Qi
∂pj
(15)
+ kQj + k(pj − cj)
∂Qj
∂pj
.
If the products are priced optimally, these partial
derivatives should be equal to zero. Note that we
can evaluate each term on the right-hand side in
the above equations empirically based on our data
set and the intermediate steps described in Sections
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Specifically, from the data we can
infer what the prices (pi) as well as what the quan-
tities (Qi) are. Based on the cost estimation pro-
cedure outlined above, we can infer the marginal
costs (ci) of each product. Finally, from the demand
estimation procedure, we can derive the price elas-
ticities and, consequently, impute what the specific
derivatives ∂Qi/∂pi are. Thus, based on the signs of
these partial derivatives, we can empirically test if
the firm’s prices are optimal, underpriced or over-
priced.
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Table 3
Parameter estimates for Adobe Photoshop and premier
bundle and its componentsa
Variable Estimates (standard error)
Constant −0.05(1.58)
ln(pbundle) 2.22
∗∗∗(0.48)
ln(pcomponent1) −0.19
∗∗∗(0.06)
ln(pcomponent2) −0.12
∗∗∗(0.03)
ln(pˆbundle) −0.24
∗∗∗(0.07)
ln(days release) 0.18∗(0.1)
R2 0.42
aStandard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent
variable is ln(sales rank ) of the bundle.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
levels, respectively.
3.5 Examples
In this section we provide the parameter estimates
for two products in our sample: Adobe Photoshop
and Premier bundle, and Microsoft Office (our re-
sults are quite robust: the estimates from bootstrap-
ping with different repetitions are the same in mag-
nitude and direction as the original estimates), sum-
marized in Tables 3 and 4.
Note that, as expected, the sign of the own-price
elasticity is positive while the signs of the cross-price
elasticities are negative (recall that an increase in
sales rank implies a decrease in sales). The other
control variable (days release) suggests that, as ex-
pected, sales of products decrease over time. The
numbers indicate that own-price elasticity is signif-
icantly higher than cross-price elasticities for the
Adobe bundle with respect to each of its two com-
ponents (pcomponent1 and pcomponent2). Interestingly,
we find that the cross-price elasticity of the high-
Table 4
Parameter estimates for versions of Microsoft Officea
Variable Estimates (standard error)
Constant 7.77(7.21)
ln(pprofessional) 1.91
∗∗∗(0.58)
ln(pstandard) −2.54
∗∗∗(−0.97)
ln(pˆprofessional) −0.36
∗∗∗(−0.11)
ln(days release) 0.01∗∗∗(0.003)
R2 0.32
aStandard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent
variable is ln(sales rank) of the high-quality version which
is Microsoft Office Professional.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
levels, respectively.
quality version of Microsoft Office with respect to
the low-quality version (pstandard), is actually higher
than the own-price elasticity. This highlights that
consumer demand for Microsoft Office Professional
is very sensitive to the price of Microsoft Office Stan-
dard. Also we do not see much variance in the ex-
tent to which competing prices from non-Amazon
sellers matter in influencing demand at Amazon; in
both cases, the cross-price elasticities (from compet-
ing sellers) are significantly lower than the own-price
elasticities. [These parameter estimates are obtained
from OLS regression models of the kind mentioned
earlier. Also, because of the structure of this indus-
try, quantity and price are not jointly determined;
thus we do not face the endogeneity concerns that
would normally arise in demand regressions. With
regard to Amazon’s own price, because software ti-
tles are produced in large quantities prior to going to
market, the quantity of new products Amazon can
sell is predetermined (and usually virtually infinite)
at the time Amazon sets its price. This follows sim-
ilar approaches taken in the literature for demand
estimation of Internet product sales using the above
assumed functional form for demand (Ghose, Smith
and Telang, 2006; Ghose and Sundararajan, 2005b;
Ghose, Huang and Sundararajan, 2005).]
As an example of a test for the optimality of pric-
ing, we take the case of Microsoft Office. Using the
estimates for own- and cross-price elasticities de-
rived for both the high- and low-quality versions
(see, e.g., Table 4 which reports the estimates for
the high-quality version) in equations (14) and (15),
we find that the estimated derivative of profits with
respect to pprofessional is −75.2 and with respect to
pstandard is −334.9. The actual magnitudes of these
estimates do not lend themselves easily to interpre-
tation. However, their signs suggest that both ver-
sions of Office are overpriced, since they are priced
at a point where the slope of the profit function is
negative. [These estimates are based on maximizing
the profits of the channel as a whole (i.e., the sum
of the profits of the retailer and the software manu-
facturer). Since we do not separate the optimization
problems of each of these firms, our estimates do not
identify whose actions need to be changed to rectify
this mispricing.]
4. CONCLUSION
Our objective in this paper is to outline analyzing
the optimality of pricing strategy of software firms
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using e-commerce panel data. While we have shown
how the widespread availability of e-commerce data
presents a number of novel empirical research oppor-
tunities, it is important to point out that there are
significant new challenges faced by researchers who
aim to analyze these data in a statistically valid and
economically meaningful way. Although our context
is price discrimination in software, the methods we
use apply equally well to e-commerce data about
any consumer product category.
A key statistical challenge in demand estimation
of this kind is that the time structure of e-commerce
data is not well understood. Granted, one can con-
trol for systematic seasonal effects (such as time of
the day or month of the year that the data were
collected) and for major event effects (such as the
release of a new version of Windows), and check
one’s data for autocorrelation. However, e-commerce
is still at a relatively early stage of its evolution and
the fraction of retail demand fulfilled by e-commerce
sites continues to grow over time. This is driven by
an increase in both the number of consumers who
shop on-line and in the fraction of their purchases
made on-line. Each of these factors may affect the
relationship of observed e-commerce demand and
price, which in turn suggests that e-commerce data
may have a complex underlying time structure.
Furthermore, new theory that models the time
structure of such e-commerce data in a more pre-
cise way, and techniques that identify and account
for time variation, may enable future research to
assess whether the demand process that generates
such observations is stationary and whether the e-
commerce market in question is, in fact, in equilib-
rium. This is a challenge not just for retail panel
data, but for other forms of data generated by con-
sumers who interact with e-commerce sites, such
as bidding/reputation data from on-line auctions.
Current research that studies the time structure of
bid paths on eBay (Bapna, Jank and Shmueli, 2004;
Jank and Shmueli, 2006) may be a first step toward
understanding similar data generation processes.
A different challenge relates to the extent to which
one can conclude that inferences from data sets such
as ours are representative of the characteristics of an
industry (in our case, consumer software) in general.
Clearly, this is likely to be less of an issue as a larger
fraction of commerce is conducted electronically. We
have benchmarked our price and demand distribu-
tions with a comparable data set from Buy.com, an-
other large software retailer. However, the frequency
with which the latter site updates its sales ranks is
different from that of Amazon, and statistical tech-
niques that enable one to assess how representative
our intraday data are based on benchmark data with
a different granularity would be helpful.
In addition to the demand and cost estimates we
have described in this paper, our research program
also involves developing econometric estimates of
how consumers perceive the relative quality levels
of related products and compare them to estimates
based on self-reported quality assessments from
Amazon.com and subjective assessments by CNET
editors. Since aggregate customer feedback measures
from eBay, Amazon.com and various other review
sites are frequently used in e-commerce research as
measures of some form of quality, statistical tech-
niques that facilitate assigning appropriate cardinal
values to e-commerce ratings data generated by con-
sumers and editors would contribute to the foun-
dations of this line of research. [The details of this
study are available in Ghose and Sundararajan (2005a).]
To summarize, we have described a sequence of
related studies that use e-commerce panel data to
evaluate the optimality of different forms of price
discrimination in the software industry. By describ-
ing our data, detailing our approach to estimating
some important parameters and summarizing some
of the issues that researchers face when conduct-
ing such statistical analyses on e-commerce data,
we have aimed to stimulate thought about statisti-
cal challenges that arise when conducting research
based on these increasingly widely used data sets.
We hope that this summary will encourage future
work that identifies and addresses these challenges,
thereby strengthening the statistical foundations of
this exciting and rapidly evolving new research area.
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